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Beginning from the choice of book cover (one of Dubioza Kolektiv’s bizarrely intelligent records 
‘Apsurdistan’) to the solution proposed to the Bosnian question, this book makes a bold effort to 
stand out from the by now lengthy bibliography available on the international community’s 
peacebuilding experiment in Bosnia. Aiming to utilize the insights from a long-term observer of 
Bosnia to not (only) lament the ills of the country, but to actually propose a strategy to eclipse its 
current status as ‘Reductio ad Absurdum’, Christopher Bennett has penned a historically solid, 
analytically robust and comprehensive account of the road from the Dayton Peace Agreement to 
the present Europeanisation strategies aimed at creating a viable state. The former International 
Crisis Group (ICG) reporter and communications director of the Office of the High 
Representative and of the EU Special Representative, knows the country and its many international 
actors extremely well, and takes the reader on a fascinating journey through the thick and thin of 
Bosnian post-war politics. At times almost tediously detailed, there is no doubt that this book 
presents a comprehensive view of the intricacy characterising international-local dynamics over the 
past 20 years. And here lies its strength; if one wish to read only one book to get introduced to 
Bosnia’s recent political history, this could very well be it. Inside perspectives on the many failed 
international attempts to build a multi-ethnic polity dot the book, and contribute to a deeper 
understanding of how poorly managed, naïve and ill designed the liberal peacebuilding project has 
been in Bosnia – or, as he writes, how “International policy had been akin to pushing a square peg 
into a round hole” (p. xxii). It also illustrates the path dependency of the international trajectory: 
from insisting on preserving the Dayton Agreement, to holding premature elections already in 
September 1996 (excellently recounted in Chapter 5, “Elections at Any Price”), many current 
problems can be explained by previous mistakes and failure to shift direction at critical junctures. 
The resultant situation is one that we know all too well: entrenched positions by the former warring 
parties whose existence is locked in a fragile – but individually profitable – status quo, propped up 
by international troops and money. Feeding into a well-established body of literature on the 
disastrous effects of neoliberal peacebuilding, this book succinctly disentangle the international-
local interactions that has produced the current situation of political deadlock along ethno-
nationalist fault lines.     
 
The book does at times take on a quasi-scientific veneer, which is not entirely convincing given the 
already rich literature which more systematically tackle democracy and divided countries. However, 
where the book stands out is in its final chapter, “Changing the Logic of Bosnian Politics”, where 
Bennett proposes a fresh solution to Bosnia’s current deadlock. It was needed, after 240 pages of 
details as to how this ‘Paralysed Peace’ came about. What Bennett proposes is perhaps more 
innovative than he admits: that Bosnia adopts a form of shared sovereignty, where Croatia and 
Serbia would enter into more transparent and formal relationship with Bosnia, and construct a 
‘double confederation’, designed in such a way that no community (Bosniak, Croat, Serb, Other) 
would be able to dominate the other. This would ensure the ‘societal security’ of each community, 
while eclipsing the straightjacket which is the ‘Bosnian question’: Bosnia would become a “bridge 
rather than a battleground between Croatia and Serbia” (p. 260). In order to ensure the good 
intentions of this arrangement, the European Union would serve as the external guarantor, Bennett 
suggests, modelled on the Allies’ long-term executive powers retained over Germany and Austria 
from 1945 to 1991. Moreover, the system would be served by a rather complicated electoral system 
based on centripetal principles of bringing people together, while taking seriously their group 
loyalty. It is a radical, bold and nothing but revolutionary proposal. Yet, while this arrangement is 
a) not acceptable to Bosniaks under the current conditions, b) would imply the dissolution of 
Republika Srpska, while c) would meet resistance also in many capitals outside of the Western 
Balkans, fearful of economic costs and political precedents, it is a refreshingly innovative thought 
in the current European climate characterised by a reversion to nationalistic solutions to global 
problems. Moreover, it is refreshing from the point of view of the Western Balkans, whose future 
rests with finding a constructive solution to the bitter and factional regional political landscape. I 
can only hope that Bennett’s book find an audience, among young Bosniaks with ambitions for 
their country, and among international actors with sufficient clout and patience to abandon the 
current strategy and think revolutionary in Bosnia. For as Bennet reminds us, changing the current 
pessimism on Bosnian politics will require nothing short of a paradigm shift, and a rethink of the 
many contentious points that formed the backdrop to the war itself: self-determination, statehood, 
sovereignty, definitions of nation, and the institutions of representative democracy.  
 
